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Abstract
Wireless networks are increasingly penetrating new range of applications,
from industry controllers, to houshold appliances. The wireless standard,
IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee, combines simple operation with low power consump-
tion. This type of network is increasingly utilized as a mechanism to monitor,
survey, sense and track.
This thesis presents a multi-domain device registration and authentica-
tion model built on key pre-distribution mechanisms in order to enable nodes
from different operational managements to interact. Little research has been
done in the area of inter-domain communication in sensor networks. Even
so, this may be an important feature to sensor networks which can open up
for new services.
Two novel suggestions for a multi-domain model are presented; hierarchi-
cal inter-domain random pool (HIDRP), and interactive inter-domain ran-
dom pool (IIDRP). The HIDRP scheme relies on a single global key-pool
containing all keys which will be used by sub-domains, thereby acting as the
equivalent of a root CA. The IIDRP scheme on the other hand, is based on
the assumption of domains containing keys derived separatly without cor-
relation. Devices from foreign domains will accordingly have no common
key-material to which key-establishment can successfully be acomplished.
Sharing common keying material happens by the exchange of keys between
the coordinator nodes in each domain. The nodes will then be able to derive
a shared secret key to enable authentication.
Since there are no protocols for inter-domain communication in the Zig-
Bee protocol, the first step will be to provide architectural changes that will
enable this function. Furthermore, a procedure to share network keys or
link-keys for devices in different domains will have to be designed.
In the HIDRP scheme, the numerical analysis was performed to evaluate
the key connectivity in relation to the size of keys involved in the distribution.
The analysis showed that as the global key pool size increased, the link
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connectivity decreased. Furthermore, no correlation was shown between key
connectivity and the size of the local key pool. Only the size of the global
key pool and the key ring affected the link connectivity.
In the IIDRP scheme, numerical simulation was performed in order to
measure the round-trip-time (RTT) for link-key aquisition in a foreign do-
main. The results showd that as the number of hops increased between the
node and the sink, so did the RTT.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Sensor Networks & Domains
Sensor networks are increasingly becoming more emerging, and new possi-
bilities and technical innovations are made possible without the limitations
imposed by the physical wire. Sensor networks are simple, robust and self-
controlling. They are characterized by a range of sensor nodes running on
battery power, often with low computational capabilities and memory. Due
to the simple hardware architecture and efficient manufacturing procedures,
sensor networks can perform various tasks and may prove to be an eco-
nomically feasable solution to many services and applications. Today, sensor
networks are used to perform monitoring, surveillance, sensing, tracking, and
measuring operations[3].
The main focus in this thesis is the type of networks used by ZigBee,
namely LR-WPANS (Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Network). A LR-
WPAN is characterized by low power-consumption, and low cost of deploy-
ment. The range is short, and it is optimalized to convey information over
short distances[14]. According to the Task Group 4 under the IEEE 802
Working Group 15, the goal is to provide a standard which has the character-
istics of ultra-low complexity, low-cost and extremely low-power for wireless
1
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connectivity among inexpensive, fixed, portable and moving devices[8].
Sensor networks are in theory considered as a closed environment[9]. How-
ever, the evolution of the WPAN standard are seeking towards both mobile
and stactic devices, allowing for a highly dynamic network. As such, devices
should be able to drift from one location to another. Such a scenario might
be troublesome with the architecture which forms the foundation of existing
networks. In this context, devices in a WPAN may have to increase their
functional operating space. In this way, devices in a WPAN or a ZigBee
network will have the ability to extend their physical operational area to
provide services beyond their home domain. Devices can thereby intercon-
nect with other devices and applications not limited to their home domains
operations. Such a feature could open up to new services where mobile nodes
could interact and share information on a more diverse level than the static
operations found by existing sensor networks. Today, the ZigBee protocol
does not support devices to drift outside their home domain to interact with
devices from other domains; inter-domain communication is not supported.
Extending the sensor network architecture to enable inter-domain com-
munication will place some important restrictions on authentication. Imag-
ine a sensor device loaded with sensitive information passing by a stationary
node. The stationary node initiates a communication request but does not
have the requried permissions. As a result, a key-agreement procedure is
declined, and the sensitive information is not compromized. This scenario
emphasizes the importance of proper authentication mechanisms in an inter-
domain environment.
ZigBee enables device authentication mechanisms based on shared sym-
metric key. When a device enters a domain, a symmetric key is derived from
preinstalled or out-of band obtained trust information[13]. Two devices will
derive a shared symmetric key with each other based on the trust informa-
tion given. As long as this process has been executed by all participating
devices in a network, the domain is protected from unauthorized access by
restricting access to only authorized devices sharing a symmetric key. This
process has to be repeated between every device that enters a certain do-
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main. With hundreds of devices in a network, the task of authentication
becomes a burden. As such, this scheme does not scale well. Furthermore,
devices that originate from different administrative domains will not be able
to communicate.
There exists several different key management schemes for wireless sensor
networks, such as random pool-based, matrix-based, polynomial-based, and
location based[9]. These schemes are based on the act of pre-loading key
material into the devices prior to deployment. The keys are first generated
in a key pool, which are then randomly distributed in subset proportions onto
the devices. These keys form the key ring of the node, and forms the basis
of shared symmetric key aquisition between two nodes. The successfulness
of this scheme relies on predicting the expected node-degree, such that the
random graph that forms at key set up is as connected as possible[3]. Key pre-
distribution is thus chosen as the key-management model which the propsed
scheme introduced later in the thesis, is based upon.
1.2 Related work
Little resarch has been done in the area of multi-domain device registration
and authentication in sensor networks. Most research I could find on the topic
of inter-domain communication is related to routing protocols. Especially,
there has been extensive research related to inter-domain authentication and
routing in wired networks. This, however falls outside the scope of this thesis.
Routing protocols that tackle inter-domain challenges have been sug-
gested. In [4], a inter-domain routing protocol (IDRM) is presented as a
solution to the problem in mobile ad-hoc network. A solution to support
the interoperation of networks governed by different administrative domains
that employ different routing protocol designs, metrics and policies is given.
This topic contrasts the main focus of the thesis, which is domains in which
the key-delegation separates the two.
In [10], trust management in inter-domain scenarios are investigated. The
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Figure 1.1: Problem description for open domains
paper introduces a design of an inter-domain PKI infrastructure in order
to establish trust relationships for organizations to protect communication
channels, or access to resources and internal data. However, relying on the
pubic key infrastructure, this scheme deemes not to be applicable in WPAN
networks.
1.2.1 Objectives
Figure 1.1 illustrates the problem of inter-domain authentication and device
registration in current ZigBee networks. Node 2 from domain B is entering
domain A, and wants to communicate with node 1 with home domain A.
Because the key pool, KP , of domain A and B are different, there are no
common key material in the key-ring, KR, of node 1 and 2. I.e., since
KPA ∩KPB = ∅,
KR1 ∩KR2 = ∅.
Consequently, both nodes will never succed in generating a link-key. This is
the obstacle in multi-domain operations.
Thus, the purpose of this thesis is
• to give an overview of the IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee protcol and general
key distribution schemes
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• to design a solution to device registration and authentication in a multi-
domain environment
• to present the results of perfomance evaluation and numerical analysis
of the design
1.2.2 Structure
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 will give an introduction to Zig-
Bee/802.15.4 networks, and an overview of general key management schemes.
Chapter 3 gives the overall design structure of HIDRP and IIDRP with il-
lustrative examples. Chapter 4 gives an evaluation and results of numerical
analysis of the HIDRP scheme, and of the performance simulation of the
IIDRP scheme. In chapter 5, a discussion is given based on the results. In
chapter 6 conclusive comments are given which summarizes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this section some background theory and technological aspects that are
useful for a better understanding of the analysis later in the thesis are pre-
sented.
2.1 IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee
The IEEE 802.25.4 is a standard that defines the protocols and intercon-
nections in a Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN). The standard has
been developed for the purpose of making a low power-consuming, reliable,
low data-rate, near range data transfer protocol. ZigBee is the name for a
standard that relies on the lower layers defined by the IEEE 802.15.4 stan-
dard. The ZigBee Alliance, the group of companies behind the standard,
has targeted a low-cost and low-power consuming wireless communication
standard. ZigBee technology is aimed towards consumer electronics, home
and building automation, industrial controls, PC peripherals, medical sensor
application, toys, and games[13].
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard defines two levels in the protocol hierarchy,
namely the physical layer (PHY) and the medium access control layer (MAC).
The purpose of only defining these two layers makes it easy for vendors
7
8 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
Figure 2.1: Protocol architecture of IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee
to define a certain behaviour by customizing the upper layers. The main
characteristics of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol will still be the same. The
ZigBee specification on the other hand, defines the two layers on top of the
PHY and MAC layers, namely the network layer (NWK) and the application
layer (APL). Figure 2.1 shows the protocol architecture of both ZigBee and
the IEEE 802.15.4.
The layers depicted in Figure 2.1 are organized according to which layer
that provides a service to another layer. The bottom layer will provide a
service through a SAP (Service Access Point) interface to the layer directly
above and so forth. The top layer, (Application Layer), will provide the end
service to the user.
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2.1.1 Physical Layer (PHY)
The physical layer is the lowest layer in the protocol stack, and hence and end-
point of transmission and reception of packets across the physical medium.
It constitute the fundamental layer where data is transmitted as raw bits, in
contrast to frames and packets formats provided by the higher-levels. The
physical layer has a number of operational tasks. This includes activation
and deactivation of the radio transceiver, energy detection, link quality indi-
cation, channel frequency selection, clear channel assessment for CSMA-CA
(Carrier Sense Mulitple Access with Collision Avoidance), and data trans-
mission and reception[7].
2.1.2 Medium Access Layer (MAC)
The MAC layer provides an interface between the APL and the PHY layer.
The MAC layer handles a number of tasks such as channel access, provid-
ing reliable transmission mechanisms, and synchronization (between to peer
MAC entities). Radio channel access is controlled using CSMA-CA. The
layer generates beacons to support synchronization, and network beacons if
the device is a coordinator. The MAC layer also supports device security,
PAN association and disassociation, handling and maintaining the Guaran-
teed Time Slot (GTS) mechanism[7].
2.1.3 Network Layer (NWK)
The NWK layer is responsible for delivering data frames across the network
to either the final destination node, or along the path through an interme-
diate node. Data frames are generated at this layer to convey application
layer protocol data units to the destination. At this level there are three
types of functional devices: ZC (ZigBee Coordinator), ZR (ZigBee Router),
and ZED (ZigBee End Device). The layer performes a number of network
management tasks, among them network discovery and formation, address
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allocation, collecting routing information, route discovery, and network wide
security. The layer is optimized to allow for low power devices to maximize
their battery life [13]
2.1.4 Application Layer (APL)
The Application Layer (APL) consists of the application support sub-layer
(APS), the ZDO (ZigBee Device Object), and the manufacturer-defined ap-
plication objects. The APS layer form an interface between the NWK layer
and the APL layer through a group of services that are used by the ZDO and
the manufacturer-defined application objects. The application framework is
where the application objects are hosted on ZigBee devices. 240 distinct ob-
jects can be defined, each with a unique endpoint address from 1 to 240. The
ZDO is a base class of functionality providing an interface between the appli-
cation objects, the device profile, and the APS. It is responsible for the APS
layer, the NWK layer, and the Security Service Provider. Furthermore, it
assembles configuration information from the end applications to determine
and implement discovery, security management, network management, and
binding management[13].
2.1.5 LR-WPAN topology
The NWK in the ZigBee protocol standard supports both star, tree and mesh
topologies, as depicted in Figure 2.2. In a star topology, the coordinator is
the central device responsible for initiating and maintaining the devices on
the network. All devices with a direct link to the coordinator are called
end devices. In mesh and tree topologies, the coordinator is responsible for
starting the network and other key network parameters. Here, certain nodes
can act as a router which will allow the network to expand the topology to
form trees or a mesh networks. The communication flow can thereby happen
in an ad-hoc manner, where router nodes forward data traffic. However, only
the routers can rely traffic. An end device will not be able to forward traffic,
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Figure 2.2: Network Topology
only receive. Thus, data flow in this type of network can be realized either
as unicast (link-wise), or multicast (network-wise)[2].
A ZigBee device can be categorized into two different types according
to its hardware configuration. The device can either be a fully functional
device (FFD) or a reduced functional device (RDF). FFDs are devices with
a hardware configuration which allows the device to perform advanced oper-
ations such as routing and control management. The coordinator device in
a network is always a FFD. RFDs on the other hand has simpler hardware
structure which limits its operational activity. These are end devices which
can not act as a router[2].
2.1.6 Security mechanisms
There are several mechanisms in the ZigBee specification including key estab-
lishment, key transport, frame protection, and device management, which all
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are part of the security services. The ZigBee security architecture includes
security mechanisms at the NWK layer and the APS layer. In addition to se-
curity for their respective frames, the APS layer also provides establishment
and maintenace of security relationships.
Two security modes are defined in the ZigBee specification; high security
mode, and standard security mode. High security mode is designed for com-
mercial applications where strict security policies are applied. In this mode
the Trust Center will have to store a list of devices, master keys, link keys
and network keys, which it needs to enforce the policies. Standard security
mode is designed for lower-security residential applications. The Trust Cen-
ter may maintain a list of devices, master keys, link keys and network keys
with all the devices in the network. However, memory requirements for the
Trust Center are lower in this mode than in high security mode[13]
ZigBee encryption is based on the 128-bit AES standard. Encryption is
available at the network level or device level. At the network level encryption
is done using the network key, while at the device level the encryption is
achieved using the link keys between every pair of nodes[1].
2.1.7 Key Management
The security in ZigBee is upheld by a set of keys distributed in the network[13].
ZigBee utilizes symmteric key distribution which is applied when secure com-
munication is required. Symmetric key, in contrast to PKI where pairs of a
private and public keys are used, uses only one key in the prosess of encryp-
tion or verification. The keys, depending on type, can be deployed to several
layers in the protocol stack. There are three main types of keys used in the
ZigBee key management scheme. These are:
Link keys: Used to secure unicast data transfer between two application-
layer peer entities. The key is 128-bit long, unique to every pair of commu-
nicating devices. A device can obtain a link key by key-transport, derive it
by key-establishment, or be preinstalled in the device. The link key is used
to generate specialized uncorrelated keys using a one-way function.
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Network key: A unique 128-bit key shared by all devices in a ZigBee net-
work. The network key is used to secure broadcast messages. The network
key can either be acquired via key-transport or be pre-installed in the device.
Two different types of network keys are available depending on the security
requrements; standard security network key and high security network key.
The practical implication of using either high security or standard security is
how the network key will be distributed, and it may also control how network
frame counters are initialized. The network key and the associated outgoing
and incoming frame counters should be available to both NWK layer and
APL layer.
Master keys: Used in the key-establishment protocol (SKKE) for acquiring
link keys, and is the basis for long-term security between the two devices.
The master key may be obtained from the Trust Center via key-transport,
be pre-installed during manufacturing, or may be based on user-entered data
(i.e. PIN).
Secure initalization and installation of these keys are vital on order to
upheld security between two devices[13].
2.1.8 Key Establishment
The key establishment produces the link-key and it is undertaken at the
Application Support Sublayer (APS)[13]. Initial trust information, such as
the master key, must be installed in each device prior to running the key
establishment protocol. The master key can also be provisioned in-band or
out-of-band. Between two devices, one takes the role as an initiator de-
vice, the other one as a responder device. The initiator will then instansiate
an APSME-ESTABLISH-KEY.request primitive at the higher layer. This
command will prompt the initiation of the SKKE (Symmetric-key key es-
tablishment) protocol. Four frames are sent between the devices as part of
the SKKE protocol. If no error conditions occur during the execution, both
the responder and the initiator device shall consider the derived key as their
newly shared link key.
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2.1.9 Trust Center
In a ZigBee security domain, an entity is given the role as the Trust Cen-
ter [13]. Only one device on the network serves as the Trust Center. This
entity is responsible for allowing devices into the network, and the distri-
bution of keys in order to fullfill trust management, network management,
and end-to-end configuration management. The Trust Center role is ususally
occupied by the coordinator device, and each secure network shall have only
one Trust Center. Each devices communicates with its Trust Center based on
either the master key or network key. In high-security networks, the master
key and address of Trust Center is either pre-installed, or sent via in-band un-
secure key transport. In low-security networks, a device communicates with
its Trust Center using the current network key, which can be preconfigured
or sent via an in-band unsecured key transport. If initial trust-information is
not pre-loaded, the Trust Center role defaults to the ZigBee coordinator[13].
The Trust Center role is the equivalent to the sink node as reffered to later
in the thesis.
2.2 Key distribution protocols
There are three types of general key agreement schemes commonly used in
key management. These are trusted-server scheme, public key scheme, and
key pre-distribution scheme[5].
The trusted-server scheme relies on a trusted server which arrange key
agreement between pairs of nodes. However, key schemes based on a trusted
third party render impractical for large scale sensor networks because of the
unknown topology prior to deployment, communication range limitations,
intermittent sensor-node operations, and network dynamics[6]. Furthermore,
this type of key distribution is dependent on a trusted infrastructure, which
may not exist in a sensor network[5]. Moreover, traffic load on selected nodes
acting as a trusted-server will likely result in an unbalanced traffic load[5].
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Public-key infrastructure (PKI) is commonly used in data security, but is
considered to require extensive processing power which makes the system un-
practical to be used solely as a key distribution system in sensor networks[11].
The third option of key distribution is pre-distribution. This scheme re-
lies on key material being generated and loaded onto devices prior to de-
ployment, and is considered the only practical option for the distribution of
keys to sensor nodes of large-scale sensor networks [6]. Pre-distribution of
keys is therefore chosen as the basic key-distribution scheme when designing
a solution for multi-domain sensor networks.
There are however different pre-distribution schemes to be considered. A
brief introduction follows on the most relevant schemes.
2.2.1 Key Pre-Distribution
Key Pre-distribution is the act of pre-loadings sensor with keying material
prior to deployment. One solution is to generate pairwise keys based on
a single mission key, carried by all nodes. This simplicity greatly reduces
resillience; if one node is compromized, the security of the entire network
will also be compromized[11].
Another solution is to implement n - 1 unique secret pairwise keys in
all n nodes in the nework. For a node, every key out of the n - 1 will be
matched with a specific node with the corresponding key. This scheme offers
optimal resillience because one compromized node does not affect the security
between other nodes. However, since memory capacity requirements increase
with the increase in number of nodes, this scheme may not be suitable for a
large sensor networks[11].
16 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
2.3 Random key-predistribution (RKPD) scheme
Eschenauer and Gligor [6] has proposed a random key-predistribution (RKPD)
scheme which relies on probabilistic key sharing. The scheme relies on cal-
culating the probability of obtaining a certain level of network connectivity.
Network connectivity is the degree of connected nodes in a network, i.e. sen-
sor nodes that have a communication path between them. The number of
keys that needs to be stored in each sensor node is based on the required prob-
ability that any two nodes share at least one key[12]. Three steps that form
the basic steps of the key distribution scheme are outlined and explained:
• Key pre-distribution phase
Prior to deployment, a large pool of P keys (e.g. 217− 220 keys) is gen-
erated off-line together with their corresponding key identifiers. Each
node randomly picks k keys from P without replacement, which will
then form the key-ring of the node. The key identifiers of the key
ring, together with the associated sensor identifier are then stored on
a trusted controller node.
• Shared-key discovery phase
During network initialization, every node discover its neighbours (i.e.
nodes within wireless range of each other) with which they share a key
with. Nodes discover if a neighbour share a key with it by receiving a
broadcasted list of the key identifiers of its neighbours key-ring. If a
node shares a common key with its neighbour, they mutually authen-
ticate to verify that the other node actually has posession of the key.
All traffic between these two nodes will be secured by link encryption.
This key will from now on be referred to as a link-key.
• Path-key establishment phase
After the shared-key discovery phase, if a node does not share a com-
mon key with one of its neighbours, they do not share any common
keying material. However, the nodes can still securely communicate by
establishing a path-key to the nodes if they are connected by two or
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Figure 2.3: RKPD
more secure links. All communication between the nodes will be then
passed along this path via secure links.
Figure 2.3 shows the pre-and post deployment phase of RKPD. In the
pre-phase, a subset KRi for node i is selected by the KDC, which is then
stored in the node. In the post-phase, node 1 and 2 sends its KR index,
Kindex to each other. Subsequently, both nodes find m = KR1 ∩KR2, and
then generate a link-key with a function of f(m)
Revocation
Upon node compromisation, the affected key ring should be revoked and
replaced. The controller node broadcasts a signed and encrypted list of k
key identifiers for the key ring to be revoked. After receiving the list, and
verifies the signature, the node locates those identifiers in its key ring, and
remove the corresponding key (if any). After revocation, some links may
disappear and will have to be restored by running the shared-key discovery
phase, and if necessary, the path-key establishment.
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Chapter 3
Proposed Scheme
The RKPD scheme has some advantages wich make it suitable as key dis-
tribution scheme compared to for example PKI. The operation and manage-
ment of the RKPD scheme is simple. Compared to the complexity of PKI
(i.e. private/public key, CA), the RKPD scheme does not require extensive
infrastructre. Secondly, RKPD is independent of location information. This
means that knowledge of deployment topology is not required in order to
guarantee an acceptable connectivity. Third, this scheme requires only a
constant size of memory in order to store keying material regardless of the
network size. Owing to its simplicity for the resource constraints in sensor
networks, RKPD is an efficient solution for an open-domain environment as
well.
In the following, a design to an open-domain environment for device
registration and authenticated is presented. Two solutions are suggested,
both leveraging on the RKPD scheme. These are hierarchical inter-domain
random-pool (HIDRP) and interactive inter-domain random-pool (IIDRP).
The essence of HIDRP is the global key distribution center, KDCRoot,
managing a single key pool for each device regardless of local domains. In
the case of IIDRP, each node need to perform additional interactions to
establish shared secret keys compared to the basic RKPD scheme.
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Probability analysis for the first scheme and performance simulation for
the latter scheme will be presented. The two schemes will be analysed and
discussed with performance related to key connectivity and round-trip-time
respectively, as important parameters.
In these scenarios, we assume that the local coordinator node (sink node)
will be a node with fully functional capabilities. Both of the schemes are
based on the RKPD scheme presented in chapter 2.
3.1 Hierarchical inter-domain random-pool
The hierachical inter-domain random-pool scheme uses a global key distri-
bution center, KDCRoot, as the key authority. The KDCRoot generates a
global key pool, (GKP ), of size w keys, corresponding to the number of
local KDC’s, KDCLocal. If the number of sub-domains is large, the size of
GKP , w, has to be correspondingly large. The GKP contain all keys that
will be used by local sub-domains. The KDCLocal is the coordinator node, in
charge of its own network domain. Figure 3.1 shows the overall schematics
of the HIDRP scheme.
3.1.1 Pre-deployment phase
At pre-deployment phase, a local KDC,KDCX , acquires a randomly selected
subset of size r from GKP , which will form the key-pool, LKPX . All nodes
residing in LKPX ’s domain will load a randomly selected subset of keys from
KDCX ’s key pool of size m. m will form the individual nodes key-ring. We
assume that each KDCX can establish a secure channel to the global KDC.
Hence, each KDCLocal can maintain the LPK securely.
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Figure 3.1: Hierarchical inter-domain random-pool
3.1.2 Key-discovery phase
The key-discovery operation is almost identical with the baisc RKPD. Key
agreement and key discovery between devices whose domain is different will
be executed according to the link-key discovery and the path-key discovery
mechanisms in the RKPD scheme.
Because the key-ring of each device is derived from a single global key-
pool, two devices originating in different domains can still share common
keys. The success rate of obtaining a common key is naturally less than the
basic RKPD scheme, where nodes share the same key-pool and key-ring size.
This however will be analyzed in the following section.
3.2 Interactive inter-domain random-pool
IIDRP is a two-level architecture between a local key distribution center
and end-devices, like the basic RKPD; there is no architectural change. In
IIDRP, keys in each domain originated from the separate local key-pool have
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Figure 3.2: Interactive inter-domain random-pool
no correlation with key pools of other local key distribution centers. Two
nodes in different domains engaged in interaction may therefore have no
probability to successfully establish a link key without further interactive
procedures. IIDRP is depicted in Figure 3.2. We assume every KDCLocal
in a network has knowledge of the device ID and index of its key-ring in its
own domain. Furthermore, we assume a secure wired channel between the
KDCLocal’s.
3.2.1 Pre-deployment phase
Every node in a domain X randomly selects a key-ring of sizem from LKPX ,
which is exactly identical with the basic RKPD scheme. In addition to a key-
ring, the nodes also receives the signature of KDCX , Siga, and a symmetric
key between KDCx and each node, SKa_n. This symmetric key will be used
for securely receiving a new key-ring from a foreign KDC.
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3.2.2 Key-discovery phase
Let us consider two nodes i and j, each belonging to different domains A
and B respectively. Node i wants to interact with node j, and is currently
within the range of node j. Node i realizes entering a foreign domain either by
detecting domain broadcast beacons sent fromKDCB in the current domain,
or from node j during communication initiation. Node i sends its node
address to KDCB, signature of its KDC, Siga, and domain name, either
directly or via intermediate nodes if i is not in range of KDCB. KDCB then
sends a message through the secure wired channel to KDCA, requesting a
confirmation of whether node i is registered with its address in domain A. If
node i is a member of domain A,KDCA replies toKDCB with a confirmation
message. This will prompt KDCB to select a new key-ring from its key-pool,
which is then sent to node i. We therefore have to assume storage capacity in
every node sufficiently large to store an extra key-ring. After receiving a new
key index from KDCB, node i and j start a key negotiation process with its
own key ring. This process is identical with the basic RKPD scheme.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation
4.1 Numerical analysis of HIDRP
In hierarchical inter-domain random-pool, the main focus has been to inves-
tigate the key connectivity. In the following, a probability analysis is per-
formed regarding the relation between size of both the global key-pool, local
key-pool and key-ring, and how this impacts the key connectivity between
two nodes from different domains.
4.1.1 Notation
- PC : the probability that two nodes succeed in sharing a secure key
- w : size of GKP (Global Key Pool) which means GKP has w-number of
keys
- r : size of Local KP (LKP)
- m : size of Key Ring (KR) for each node
- c : the number of common keys in two LKPs (say, LKPA and LKPB for
domain A and B, respectively)
- d : the number of different keys in two LKPs, d = r − c
- pL(i) : the probability that two LKPs have i different keys in their LKP.
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This means two arbitrary LKPs share r − i number of keys that are
identical between two LKPs where 0 ≤ i ≤ r.
- p(i) : the conditional probability that two nodes do not share any key under
the condition of - pL(i) where p(i) = 1 under i = r.
w-number of materials
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Figure 4.0 Key distribution process
Figure 4.0 illustrates the key distribution process for a node a and b. Node
a and b are governed by domain A and B, respectively. The key-ring, KR,
for node a and b are randomly selected from its LKP. Both LKPs are subsets
randomly selected from GKP. LKP-A has up to c-number of common keys
with LKP-B.
4.1.2 Probabilistic Results
PC is calculated by 1 - Pr[two devices do not share any key in their key rings].
The probability of two end-devices do not share any keys may be affected by
the distribution pattern of LKP from GKP. If two LKPs share more keys,
the hit rate of two devices managed by each LKP is lager. Therefore i, the
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number of different keys between two LKPs will affect the final PC value.
The goal is to calculate PC = 1−∑ri=0 p(i) · pL(i).
pL(i) is related to constructing LKP from GKP while p(i) is related to dis-
tributing a KR for each sensor device from its LKP.
pL(i) is calculated as follows,
pL(i) =
 w
r − i
 w − r + i
2i
 2i
i

 w
r
2
(4.1)
The total number of ways for both LKPs to pick r keys from w is
 w
r
2.
Both LKPs have r − i keys in common. There are
 w
r − i
 ways to pick
the r− i common keys. After r− i common keys have been picked, w−(r− i)
keys remains in GKP. The number of distinct keys between the two LKP’s is
2i. The 2i distinct keys should be partitioned between the two LKPs equally.
The number of such partitions are
 2i
i
.
Next, p(i) is calculated as follows,
p(i) =
m∑
j=0
 r − i
m− j
 i
j
 r −m+ j
m

 r
m
2
(4.2)
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Figure 4.1: The three possible ways to select m keys from r
The way for both nodes to pick m keys from r is
 r
m
2. There are three
ways to select m keys from r, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The first possibility
is when m consists exclusively of c-numbers of common keys. The second
possibility is when m consists of only d-number of distinct keys. The third
possibility is when m consists of both identical and distinct portions. There
are
 r − i
m− j
 ways to pick from r − i identical portion and
 i
j
ways
to pick remaining j keys from the remaining i keys.
 r −m+ j
m
 is the
number of ways the node can select m keys without selecting any common
keys with the other node.
.
4.2 Numerical Analysis
Figure 4.2 shows PC according to variation of w and m under r = 100. As
the number of keys in the global key-pool, GKP, increases, the probability
of a successfull key-establishment between two nodes, PC , decreases. The
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Figure 4.2: The connection rate according to size of w and m.
Figure 4.3: The connection rate according to size of w and r.
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figure shows three functions with different inputs of m. When the size of
KR increases, PC also increases, which has an intuitative interpretation; the
nodes have a better chance of sharing a common key as the total number of
keys to choose from is larger. If we want to maintain PC larger than 95%,
then we have to set the size of KR for each device to 40 or more.
Figure 4.3 shows PC according to variation of w and r under m = 30.
Interestingly, r does not have any affect on PC ; the probability remains the
same regardless of the size of LKP. As r increases, so does the probability
for a key to be contained in both KDC’s. However, this increase in the local
key-pool decreases the chance for a common key to be picked by two nodes,
i.e the success-rate for sharing a key. In fact, the increase in probability
for sharing a key in the KDCs is exactly as big as the probability for not
succeeding in sharing a common key with two different key-rings. These
probabilities cancel each other out, and causes the success-probability to
stay constant, in parallel to a zero sum game. Therefore, in HIDRP, the
important values for successfully establishing a link-key between two nodes
from different domains, PC , are the size of the global key-pool, w , and the
size of the key-ring, m, rather than the size of the local key-pool, r.
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Figure 4.4: IIDRP key-discovery
4.3 Performance Evaluation of IIDRP
When a device comes within the range of a foreign domain, we cannot suc-
cessfully establish a link-key, unless the keys in both domains originates from
a common global key-pool, GKP . However, devices originating from differ-
ent domains should be able to authenticate one another based on alterna-
tive measures. Interactive inter-domain random-pool will address this issue.
Since we assume that key-distribution in this scenario has happened in an
isolated manner, we do not consider initial link-and path key discovery. In
this numerical simulation, the focus has been on the elapsed time from a
node enters a foreign domain, to when a link-key has been successfully es-
tablished between the two participating nodes. Specifically, the round-trip
time, RTT, has been measured. In the following, a numerical simulation of
the round-trip time of link-key acquisition in IIDRP is shown. The simula-
tion was done in Matlab, and the results from the simulation were saved to
files and analyzed using Matlab scripts.
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4.3.1 Simulation Scenarios
Figure 4.4 depicts a scenario where a node from a foreign domain A enters
domain B. In this case, KDCB is a foreign KDC of node i. Upon entering
domain B, node i identifies the domain by receving beacons broadcasted
by the sink or a certain node in the domain. In step 2, node i sends the
signature of its domain, SigA, encrypted by the symmetric key between the
sink and node, SKa_i, and the identity of both domain A, DIDA, and its
own id, to the foreign sink, KDCB. In step 3, the KDCB acquires SKai
from KDCA and verifies SigA. In step 4, if SigA is correct, KDCB selects a
new key-ring at random and sends it to node i, encrypted with SKa_i. In
step 5, after receiving the encrypted new key-ring, node i can initiate the
key sharing process with any node in domain A. The procedure is identical
with the basic random pool scheme. In case of receiving a key-ring with
no common keys with the responder device, an alternative route based on
multiple link-key paths to the destination node has to be set up.
The first simulations shows the RTT in the scenario described above. The
figures shows how the round-trip-time (i.e., the time from a node enters a
domain to link-key is received) changes as the number of hops increases. As
the simulation has been configured numerically and not by using numbers
obtained by simulating real traffic, the propagation time from node to node
has been predefined with a mean and standard deviation. In this exam-
ple, the sink-to-sink and node-to-node values has been set to a predefined
mean and standard deviation. Simulating 1000 hops, the RTT time from
node to node has been generated from the delay function. This function
takes the predefined mean and standard deviation as parameters, multiplies
the standard deviation with the randn-function (0.1≤ x 0.99) which returns
a pseudorandom value drawn from the standard normal distribution. The
mean is then added to the result. This gives random RTT values close to the
predefined mean.
Figure 4.5 shows the average RTT and relation of different node-to-node
mean values. Average RTT is shown on the Y-axis and the number of hops
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Figure 4.5: Average RTT
is shown on the X-axis. The three graphs indicate the average RTT with dif-
ferent predefined means, with the blue graph representing the lowest mean.
The RTT value from sink-to-sink is set constant with a mean of 2 ms, and
standard deviation to 0.5 ms. This value is kept constant due to the physical
connection between the sink nodes, and RTT values will therefore not vary
signifficantly. The total RTT has been derived from this equation: RTT
= RTT_dd*(nr of hops) + RTT_ss + PTa + PTb. The signal has to go
through n nodes, so this number is multiplied with the roundt trip time from
node to node RTT_dd. Furthermore, sink-to-sink time is added. Finally,
processing time, PTa and PTb, in the sink node is added.
As we can see from the figure, the average RTT increases as the number of
hops increases in all three cases. Higher mean results in an higher growth
rate of RTT, as shown by the higher rate of growth by the red graph com-
pared to the blue graph with a lower mean.
The second simulation, shown in Figure 4.6 shows the average RTT on
the Y-axis and the ratio between node-to-node RTT and sink-to-sink RTT
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Figure 4.6: RTT ratio
on the X-axis. The blue, green, and red graph represents average RTT as the
number of hops has been set to 3, 4, and 5 hops respectively. The average
RTT has been derived from the same equation as the previous example, and
average RTT has been calulated from 1000 simulations.
The ratio is the fraction of RTT_dd over RTT_ss. Because we investigate an
effect of the variable RTT_dd and RTT_ss value simultaneously, we deploy
the ratio rather than defining each value.
We consider three cases according to the number of hops between an end-
device and sink node. Figure 4.6 shows that as the number of hops between
the sink and an end-device increases, the total RTT gets longer. Also, as
the RTT_dd gets longer compared to the static RTT_ss, the total RTT
increases. Because there are multiple hops between a device and the sink,
the relative propagation time for an increase in device-to-device, the total
RTT proportionally increases.
Chapter 5
Discussion
Regarding HIDRP, one key issue is to determine the relative proportion of
keys in the global and local key pools, in addition to the key chain that end
end-devices have to store. If the number of subdomains is high, the number
of keys in the global key pool should accordingly be high. The probability
analysis in HIDRP showed the probability for successfully deriving a link-
key between two devices related to the size of keys involved, especially the
size of the global key pool and key-ring in end-device. The results from the
calculation showed that in order to maintain a high probability (i.e.,>95%)
of link-key establishment, the global key pool should not exceed 600 keys
under the condition that the key-ring size is 40. With the size of 30 nodes,
less than 500 keys in the global key pool are required in order to guarantee
link-key establishment of 85% and above.
Regarding HIDRP, having one single key-pool requires careful planning
and central governing. Strong requirements should be devoted on the key re-
vocation mechanisms, since compromised keys will have to be traced back to
the global pool for replacement. Subsequently, these keys have to be replaced
in every domain where these keys occurred since all keys stem originally from
the same key pool. To minimize this rebound effect, one could increase the
total size of the key pool. However, this will result in a lower key connectivity.
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One merit of RKPD is that an administrator can adjust the preferable
key success rate by selecting the key pool or key ring size. Furthermore,
such a variable setting can be configured once at the initial phase, that is,
before node deployment. Hence, the HIDRP scheme achieves the optimized
key connectivity for inter-domain sensor networks. Besides, HIDRP does not
require operational changes in the end-devices.
The main difference between the HIDRP and IIDRP is that the IIDRP
maintains a two-level topology like the basic RKPD scheme. IIDRP requires
end-devices for additional operations for acquiring a new key ring from a
foreign KDC.
The simulation of the IIDRP scheme provides an implication of the IIDRP
performance according to the number of hops from an end-device to the sink.
Based on the number of hops and pre-defined propagation delay between
devices, the simulation results show several performance comparisons. How-
ever, it should be recognized that this simplified numerical simulation has
some limitations; it does not simulate a real sensor network environment.
Accordingly, the results does not reflect sensor node behaviour as a real-life
simulation would have done. As a result ad-hoc behaviour, and transmission
delay inherent in sensor networks are not taken into consideration. Instead,
predefined values had to be set which reflect real node-to-node propagation
delay. In this sense, the simulation still provides a sense on how the round-
trip-time, RTT evolves over node-hops. To fully investigate the potential of
IIDRP, real life simulation should be further performed.
The wired channel between the sink nodes presents some challenges. One
the one hand, it provides good security with well-known security protocols
such as SSL and IPSec where eavesdropping becomes much more difficult
than a wireless transmission would have presented. However, this wired line
might deem to cause un-negligable overhead if the geographical areas between
the domains are big.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis suggest a solution to multi-domain device registration and au-
thentication in a ZigBee network. In theory, sensor networks are considered
a closed environment[9]. Even so, the scheme presented suggests that devices
may not necessarily be bound to their home domain.
The subject of this thesis was to propose a scheme in order to enable inter-
domain communication by nodes in separate domains in a ZigBee network.
Two novel schemes for this purpose has been suggested, IIDRP and HIDPR.
Both schemes leverages on the basic RKPD scheme for the distribution of
keys. The two schemes differ in how the link-keys are obtained. HIDRP
solves inter-domain communication by distributing keys hierarchical using a
global key pool, while IIDRP relies on on-site key-sharing from distinctive
key-pools to establish a link-key. In contrast, ZigBee uses a master key,
provisioned by pre-installment or by the Trust Center to derive the symmetric
key. A node that has not been pre-installed with trust information, or been
loaded with user-entered data, has no possibilities to join a foreign network.
The numerical analysis in HIDRP showed the link-connectivity probabil-
ity when different amounts of keys were deployed. It showed that by increas-
ing the number of keys, m, in the key-ring, an increase in the connection rate
could be observed. However, as the number of total keys in GKP increased,
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the connection rate declined. A doubling of the key-pool size resulted in
15% decline in the connection rate. Furthermore, the graphical calculation
showed that the size of LKP , r, did not affect the connection rate when
the key-ring size was kept constant. Hence, the important parameters for
determining the key connectivity are the size of GKP , and the size of the
key ring KR.
The IIDRP scheme gives an effective solution to the inter-domain problem
when the domains does not inherit keys from a single KDCRoot. IIDRP
assumes a wired secure channel between the participating KDCLocal’s. The
simulations was done in order to investigate the round-trip-time from when
a node enters a foreign domain, to when it has obtained the key ring. The
results of the simulation showed that as the number of hops between the
foreign node and KDCLocal increased, so did the RTT.
6.1 Future work
A natural step to further advance or enhance the structure of the propositions
will be to implement the schemes in a real simulation environment in order
to get key value parameters. The HIDRP scheme should be evaluated based
on node compromise fraction, which has not been evaluated here. Also, this
scheme depend on strong security mechanisms in order to guarantee reason-
able authentication. As such, security in the key delegation process should
be investigated further. The IIDRP should be tested on the performance of
link-key aquisition in a real simulation environment.
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